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The Exemplar Approach to Science and Religion 
 
Abstract 
We can judge whether some activities are scientific or religious, depending on how similar 
they are to exemplar scientific activities or to exemplar religious activities, even if we cannot 
specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for science and religion. The absence of the 
demarcation between science and religion does not justify the school policy of teaching the 
creationist hypothesis that God created the universe any more than it justifies the religious 
policy of teaching evolutionary theory, quantum mechanics, and the Big Bang theory in 
religious institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
How should we distinguish between science and religion? Are there distinctive features of 
science that set it apart from religion, and distinctive features of religion that set it apart from 
science? These questions are interesting in themselves, but they also have grave practical 
implications. As Gregory Peterson (2002) and William Hasker (2009) note, some creationists 
argue that schools should teach the creationist hypothesis that God created the universe. If 
there is, however, a tenable criterion for distinguishing between science and religion, we can 
use it against the creationists’ suggestion. 
Larry Laudan (1982) is reputed to have demolished the demarcation between science 
and religion. As Robert Pennock (2011: 180) observes, creationists cite Laudan’s putative 
destruction of the demarcation between science and religion to argue that schools should 
teach the creationist hypothesis. Those creationists are J. P. Moreland, a philosopher at Biola 
University, Stephen Meyer, a philosopher at Discovery Institute, and Casey Luskin, a staffer 
at Discovery Institute. The aim of this paper is to show that Laudan’s alleged obliteration of 
the demarcation between science and religion does not establish that the creationist 
hypothesis should be included in science texts. 
My discussion proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I present Laudan’s case against some 
philosophers’ attempts to demarcate between science and religion in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. In Section 3, I criticize the aforementioned creationists’ inference that 
since there is no strict distinction between science and religion, the creationist hypothesis 
should be taught in science classrooms. In Section 4, I invoke the exemplar theory of concept 
representation in cognitive psychology to explain why it is inappropriate to teach the 
creationist hypothesis in schools. In Section 5, I argue that our children should be exposed to 
exemplar scientific activities, as opposed to exemplar religious activities and borderline 
activities, in science classrooms. In Section 6, I reply to some possible objections. 
 
2. Laudan’s Criticism 
What feature of science makes it what it is? What is the feature of science such that if an 
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enterprise does not have it, it is not science, and if an enterprise has it, it is science? In other 
words, what is the necessary and sufficient condition for science? This question is answered 
by some philosophers of science. This section examines their answers and Laudan’s critiques 
of them.  
Carl Hempel proposes testability as the hallmark of science. On his account, if a 
hypothesis is not testable, it is not scientific. If it is testable, it is scientific. He says, “no 
statement or set of statements T can be significantly proposed as a scientific hypothesis or 
theory unless it is amenable to objective empirical test, at least ‘in principle’” (Hempel, 1966: 
30). A hypothesis is testable if and only if we can obtain observational data to determine 
whether it is true or false. A hypothesis is confirmed when it agrees with the experimental 
outcome, and disconfirmed when it disagrees with the experimental outcome.  
In contrast, Karl Popper proposes falsifiability as the hallmark of science. On his 
account, if a hypothesis is not falsifiable, it is not scientific. If it is falsifiable, it is scientific. 
He says, “The criterion of falsifiability is a solution to this problem of demarcation, for it 
says that statements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be 
capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable, observations” (Popper, 1963: 51). A 
hypothesis is falsifiable just in case we can conceive of an observation that proves it to be 
false. Popper’s proposal stems from his observation that we can prove a general hypothesis to 
be false, although we cannot prove it to be true.  
Can we use Hempel’s or Popper’s criterion to distinguish between science and 
religion? Can we say, for example, that evolutionary theory should be taught in science 
classrooms, but creationism should not be, on the grounds that evolutionary theory is testable 
or falsifiable whereas creationism is not? Laudan says no. He observes that creationists make 
many testable claims. They claim, for example, that “the earth is of very recent origin (say 
6,000 to 20 thousand years old),” and that “animals and man were created at the same time” 
(Laudan, 1982: 49). These “claims are testable, they have been tested, and they have failed 
those tests” (Laudan, 1982: 49). Thus, some creationist claims are testable and falsifiable. 
Let me now turn to Thomas Kuhn’s distinction between science and other enterprises. 
He claims that to be scientific is almost the same as to do normal science. He says, “this is for 
now my main point, a careful look at the scientific enterprise suggests that it is normal 
science, in which Sir Karl’s sort of testing does not occur, rather than extraordinary science 
which most nearly distinguishes science from other enterprises” (Kuhn, 1970: 6). When 
scientists do normal science, they solve puzzles within a paradigm, i.e., they articulate the 
paradigm, they apply it to diverse parts of the world, and they develop scientific instruments, 
such as electron microscopes and particle accelerators. Most importantly, they do not discard 
the paradigm, even if it conflicts with experimental results. When experimental outcomes 
clash with the paradigm, blame is put not on the paradigm but on scientists’ ability to perform 
experiments. 
Can we use Kuhn’s criterion to distinguish between science and religion? Park (2016: 
48) says no on the grounds that there is an aspect of science that Kuhn’s philosophy of 
science cannot account for. Theoretical physicists today attempt to unify quantum physics 
and general relativity. These two theories are fundamental physical theories belonging to 
different paradigms. It is not clear whether the theoretical physicists are doing normal 
science. It is clear, though, that they are doing science. So doing normal science is not the 
hallmark of science. 
Can we say that scientists are open-minded, so they revise their beliefs in the light of 
new experimental results, whereas creationists are closed-minded, so they do not revise their 
religious beliefs in the light of counterevidence? Laudan says no. He observes that 
creationists sometimes modify their opinions in response to new evidence, changing “their 
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minds from time to time” (Laudan, 1982: 49–50). Moreover, “the scientists of any epoch 
likewise regard some of their beliefs as so fundamental as not to be open to repudiation or 
negotiation” (Laudan, 1982: 50). In short, creationists are open-minded just like scientists at 
times, and scientists are closed-minded just like creationists at other times. 
Laudan has made a valuable contribution to the debate over the demarcation between 
science and religion. He has shown that it is difficult to define science and religion in terms 
of necessary and sufficient conditions. Counterexamples spell doom for the proposals that the 
hallmarks of science are testability, falsifiability, normal science, and being open-minded.  
 
3. Critiques of the Creationist Inference 
What can we conclude from the fact that Laudan has provided counterexamples against some 
philosophical attempts to demarcate between science and religion in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions? As already noted in the introduction of this paper, some creationists 
conclude that the creationist hypothesis should be taught in schools. Their inference 
exemplifies the inference scheme that since there is no demarcation between two enterprises, 
a view taught in one enterprise should also be taught in the other enterprise. This section aims 
to reduce this creationist inference scheme to absurdity. 
The creationist inference scheme has the following three absurd consequences. First, we 
should also teach science in religious institutions. For example, we should teach evolutionary 
theory and the Big Bang theory in religious institutions, such as churches, Buddhist temples, 
mosques, and Hindu temples. To implement this policy, religious institutions should be 
equipped with scientific instruments, such as particle accelerators and electron microscopes, 
and religious leaders, such as ministers, priests, and Buddhist monks, should be required to 
have at least master’s degrees in science. After all, it is wrong to say that the absence of the 
demarcation between science and religion justifies the policy of teaching the creationist 
hypothesis in science classrooms, but not the policy of teaching evolutionary theory and the 
Big Bang theory in religious institutions.  
Second, different religions have different creation stories about how the universe came 
about. The creationist hypothesis is just one of them. Muslims reject it, and accept instead 
that Allah created the universe. If we should teach the creationist hypothesis in schools, we 
should also teach the creation stories of other religions in schools. After all, it is unfair to 
teach the former, but not the latter, in schools. 
Third, there is no strict distinction between different religions. So if the creationist 
inference scheme is correct, we should also teach Christian doctrines in Hindu temples, 
Islamic doctrines in churches, Hindu doctrines in mosques, and so forth. Furthermore, 
ministers should cut their hair short like Buddhist monks, and chant Buddhist scripture in 
churches. Buddhist monks should grow their hair long like ministers, and sing hymns in 
Buddhist temples. Muslims and Hindus would also have to follow the customs of other 
religions. 
In sum, Laudan has opened a street between science and religion. On close examination, 
however, the street is not a one-way street but a two-way street. Moreover, it obliterates not 
only the separation between science and religion but also the separation between different 
religions. The obliteration of the separations would be unsavory even to creationists. They 
would find it disagreeable that we should teach the Big Bang theory in religious institutions, 
Muslims’ creation story in science classrooms, Buddhist doctrines in churches, and so forth. 
An interesting question arises. Why is it inappropriate to teach the Big Bang theory in 
religious institutions, the creationist hypothesis in schools, Christian doctrines in Buddhist 
temples, and so on? A tenable answer to this question cannot be found in the definitions of 
science, religion, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism, appealing to necessary and 
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sufficient conditions for these enterprises. It can rather be found in the exemplar theory of 
concept representation to which I turn now. 
 
4. The Exemplar Theory  
Ordinary concepts are not represented by necessary and sufficient conditions. Think about the 
concept of bird. An animal does not have to be able to fly to be a bird, given that there are 
birds that cannot fly, such as ostriches and kiwis. So the ability to fly is not a necessary 
condition for a bird. Even if an animal can fly, it might not be a bird. For example, a bat and 
an insect can fly, but they are not birds. So the ability to fly is not a sufficient condition for a 
bird. It is difficult to provide the specification of the necessary and sufficient condition for a 
bird. Naturally, it is also difficult to provide the specification of the necessary and sufficient 
condition for science. 
Even if ordinary people do not know the necessary and sufficient condition for a bird, 
they do not usually have a problem in classifying an object as a bird or a non-bird. Show a 
picture of a crow to children and ask them whether it is a bird or not. They will immediately 
answer that it is. Show a picture of a dragonfly to them and ask them whether it is a bird or 
not. They will immediately answer that it is not. How can ordinary people classify an object 
with ease, when they do not know the necessary and sufficient condition for the object? An 
answer to this question can be found in cognitive psychology. 
Cognitive psychologists (Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Estes, 1986) argue that we use 
excellent examples called ‘exemplars’ to classify objects. For example, we use such birds as 
an eagle and a pigeon to classify birds. When asked to judge whether a crow is a bird, we 
compare the crow with the exemplar birds for similarity. The similarity between the crow and 
the exemplar birds is above the threshold. So we classify the crow as a bird. How about a 
dragonfly? The similarity between the dragonfly and the exemplar birds is below the 
threshold. So we classify the dragonfly as a non-bird. To generalize, when asked to judge 
whether an object is an instance of a certain kind, we compare the object with exemplars of 
that kind for similarity. If the similarity is above a threshold, we classify the object as an 
instance of that kind. If the similarity is below the threshold, we classify it as an instance of 
another kind. Thus, it is exemplars, not necessary and sufficient conditions, that enable us to 
classify objects. 
The exemplar theory of concept representation sketched above has three interesting 
implications for the present issue of demarcating between science and religion. The first 
implication is that it is inappropriate to look for the necessary and sufficient condition for 
science. Hempel, Popper, and Kuhn put forward testability, falsifiability, and normal science, 
respectively, as the necessary and sufficient condition for science. They undertook a task that 
was fated to fail. We do not use a necessary and sufficient condition, but rather exemplars, to 
determine whether a target activity is scientific. When asked to judge whether a given activity 
is scientific, we compare it with exemplar scientific activities for similarity. If the similarity 
is above a threshold, it is classified as scientific. If it is below the threshold, it is classified as 
non-scientific. 
What are exemplar scientific activities? My tentative answer is that setting up a 
hypothesis, performing an experiment to test it, operating scientific instruments, publishing 
research results, securing research funds from funding agencies, and so forth, are exemplar 
scientific activities. Let me emphasize that these activities are neither individually necessary 
nor jointly sufficient for being scientific. All I am saying is that if a certain activity is 
sufficiently similar to them, it is classified as scientific. 
Let me focus on the first exemplar scientific activity, viz., setting up a hypothesis. 
Scientists do not advance any hypothesis, but only certain kinds of hypotheses. The following 
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two hypotheses can be regarded as exemplar scientific hypotheses: 
 
(S1) F=ma 
(S2) Antarctica, Australia, and South American once formed a giant continent, and 
marsupials moved from South America to Australia via Antarctica millions of years 
ago.  
 
(S1) is Newton’s second law of motion. It depicts how force, mass, and acceleration are 
related to one another. (S2) is a hypothesis about the continents and the marsupials. It makes 
the true novel prediction that marsupial fossils exist in Antarctica (Woodburne and 
Zinsmeister, 1982). We can classify a hypothesis as scientific or non-scientific, depending 
how similar it is to hypotheses like (S1) and (S2). 
I have chosen (S1) as an exemplar scientific hypothesis because it is a law of nature. 
Scientists are more interested in discovering regularities of nature than in collecting facts that 
bear no relationship to one another. (S1) enables us to make quantitatively accurate 
predictions about objects. It tells us what acceleration an object will have, if a certain amount 
of force is imposed on it. By contrast, religious hypotheses, including the creationist 
hypothesis, do not yield such precise predictions. Moreover, even if they do, it is not clear 
whether they can be regarded as exemplar religious hypotheses. Imagine that ordinary 
religious followers go to churches or to Buddhist temples. To their surprise, however, 
ministers and Buddhist monks deal with mathematical equations like (S1), demonstrating 
quantitatively accurate predictions instead of performing religious rituals. The followers 
would think that that is not an exemplar religious activity, and hence that is not what they 
would expect from their religious leaders. 
I have chosen (S2) as an exemplar scientific hypothesis because it made a novel 
prediction as a result of combining the knowledge from different fields of science. Scientists 
combined biological knowledge with geological knowledge to think up (S2). In contemporary 
science, different fields of science are not isolated from one another, but interact with one 
another (Trefil and Hazen, 2012). Interdisciplinary research is common in contemporary 
science. In contrast, Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus seldom form joint research 
teams for common religious agenda. Even if they do, they neither make nor confirm novel 
predictions comparable to (S2). Even if they do, it is not clear that their activities can be 
regarded as religious. Imagine again that ordinary religious followers go to churches or 
Buddhist temples for religious purposes. To their surprise, however, ministers and Buddhist 
monks combine the information from Christianity and Buddhism to make novel predictions 
instead of performing religious rituals. The followers would again think that that is not an 
exemplar religious activity, and that their religious leaders are not doing what they are 
supposed to do. 
The second implication of the exemplar theory for the issue of demarcating between 
science and religion is that there is no necessary and sufficient condition for religion either. 
There is no feature of religion that makes religion what it is. We can only judge whether an 
activity is religious, depending on how similar it is to exemplar religious activities. What 
activities are exemplar religious activities? My tentative answer is that believing a scripture, 
worshiping a deity, participating in congregations, giving prayers, and singing songs like 
Amazing Grace are exemplar religious activities. 
Let me focus on the first exemplar religious activity, viz., believing a scripture. A 
scripture is different from a science text in that it contains statements not like (S1) and (S2) 
but like (R1) and (R2): 
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(R1) God resurrected Jesus on the third day of his death. 
(R2) The Sun stood still, and the Moon stayed, until the people avenged themselves 
upon their enemies. 
 
We classify a statement as religious or non-religious, depending on how similar it is to 
exemplar religious statements like (R1) and (R2). 
The third implication of the exemplar theory regards the fact that there are many 
religions in the world, including Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism, to 
name a few. How do we differentiate between different religions? Each religion has its own 
exemplar activities. Believing the Bible and singing a hymn in front of a cross in a church are 
exemplar activities of Christianity. Having a very short hairstyle, chanting a Buddhist 
scripture, and making deep bows in front of a Buddha statue in a Buddhist temple are 
exemplar activities of Buddhism. Islam and Hinduism have their own exemplar activities too. 
Imagine that you go to a church. To your surprise, however, some people in the church wear 
hijabs on their heads. You would think that their behavior is inappropriate in a church. But 
why is it inappropriate? A natural answer to this question is that wearing a hijab is more 
similar to exemplar activities of Islam than those of Christianity. So it is an appropriate 
behavior not in a church but in a mosque. In short, each religion has exemplar activities. We 
judge whether a target activity belongs to Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, or Hinduism, 
depending on how similar it is to the exemplar activities of those religions. 
 
5. The Exemplar Theory and Science Education 
Suppose that you aim to help children to acquire the concept of bird. The exemplar theory 
implies that the best way to achieve your aim is to show them exemplar birds, such as an 
eagle and a pigeon. You should not present to them the objects that are near the borderline 
between birds and non-birds, such as a penguin and a bat. A penguin is a bird, although it 
swims in the sea. A bat is not a bird, although it flies in the sky. Showing such objects to 
children is not the best way to help them acquire the concept of bird. 
How should we teach science to schoolchildren? The exemplar theory implies that the 
best way to do it is to expose them to exemplar scientific activities, such as setting up 
hypotheses and performing experiments. We should expose them neither to exemplar 
religious activities nor to borderline activities. An interesting question is whether the 
creationist hypothesis that God created the universe is an exemplar scientific hypothesis, an 
exemplar religious hypothesis, or a borderline hypothesis. Intuitively, it is more similar to 
(R1) and (R2) than to (S1) and (S2). After all, it is not a law of nature. It does not enable us to 
make quantitatively accurate predictions, as (S1) does. Nor is it a result of knowledge from 
different fields of science, as (S2) is. Neither does it make a novel prediction, as (S2) does. 
Moreover, it clashes with the first law of thermodynamics, which states that mass-energy can 
neither be created nor be destroyed. The first law implies that it is impossible to create even 
an atom, let alone the universe, although it is possible to move an atom from one place to 
another.  
Creationists would reply that God is omnipotent, so he can break the first law of 
thermodynamics. If they say so, however, the creationist hypothesis only moves farther from 
exemplar scientific hypotheses, for no scientist defends his or her hypotheses by invoking the 
omnipotence of God. If a manuscript invoking the omnipotence of God were submitted to 
scientific journals, such as Nature, Science, and Cell, editors would reject it without even 
sending it to external reviewers. Their decisions are based on the fact that the statements 
invoking the omnipotence of God are more similar to exemplar religious statements than to 
exemplar scientific statements. 
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Some creationists try to justify the creationist hypothesis by tapping into science. For 
example, they claim that they have found the remains of Noah’s Ark near the top of Mount 
Ararat in Eastern Turkey and the archaeological evidence for the location of the Garden of 
Eden.  
Let me say, however, that even if such attempts are successful, the creationist 
hypothesis can at best be viewed as a borderline hypothesis between scientific and religious 
hypotheses. As I argued earlier, a borderline hypothesis between science and religion does not 
have a place in science texts. 
My suggestion that we should expose our schoolchildren to exemplar scientific 
activities, as opposed to exemplar religious hypothesis or borderline hypotheses, goes well 
with Kuhn’s philosophy of science education. According to Kuhn, students become scientists 
by being exposed to exemplars. In this context, exemplars are problem-solutions that set the 
precedents for future research. For example, the outcome of the Michelson-Morley 
experiment was a puzzle to physicists in the nineteenth century who had been working under 
the framework of the ether theory. Einstein solved the puzzle with his special theory of 
relativity, which led scientists to think that it can be used to solve other puzzles as well. 
 
6. Objections and Replies 
Many readers will take issue with my suggestion that (S1) and (S2) are exemplar scientific 
hypotheses, and with my suggestion that (R1) and (R2) are exemplar religious statements, and 
with the suggestion that wearing a hijab is an exemplar Islamic activity. There are other 
scientific hypotheses that can better serve as exemplar scientific hypotheses, and there are 
other religious statements that can better serve as exemplar religious statements. Moreover, 
any similarity judgment about a target activity and exemplars is controversial. Different 
people make opposite similarity judgments about an activity and exemplars. For example, 
some people may claim that a certain activity is more similar to exemplar activities of 
Christianity, while other people may claim that it is more similar to exemplar activities of 
Islam. 
The existence of such problems, however, does not mean that religion should be taught 
in science classrooms, that science should be taught in religious institutions, and that a 
doctrine of a religion should be taught in the religious institution of another religion. Critics 
disagreeing with this reply owe us an account of why it is inappropriate to teach science in 
religious institutions, and to teach a doctrine of a religion in the religious institution of 
another religion. Why is it inappropriate to wear a hijab in a church? Why is it inappropriate 
to sing a hymn in a Buddhist temple? Christians cannot say that wearing a hijab in a church is 
inappropriate because such behavior does not fit the definition of Christianity. Nor can 
Buddhists say that singing a hymn in a Buddhist temple is inappropriate because such 
behavior does not fit the definition of Buddhism. After all, it is extremely difficult to provide 
the specification of the necessary and sufficient conditions for Christianity and Buddhism. 
Creationists might now argue that the creationist hypothesis deserves a place in the US 
public schools, whereas the creation stories of Buddhism, Islam, and Hinduism do not, 
because the majority of the taxpayers in the US are Christians. On this account, it is 
legitimate to teach the creation story of Buddhism in the public schools of Buddhist 
countries, that of Islam in the public schools of Islamic countries, and that of Hinduism in the 
public schools of Hindu countries. Let me call this argument ‘the argument from politics.’ 
The argument from politics is reminiscent of Pascal’s wager. It holds that we should 
believe in God because he might exist. If he exists, we will go to heaven. If he does not exist, 
we have nothing to lose. Pascal has provided the pragmatic justification for the view that God 
exists. To advance such an argument is to admit that there is no good epistemic justification 
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for the view that God exists. Similarly, to advance the argument from politics is to admit that 
there is no good epistemic reason for teaching the creationist hypothesis in schools. It is not 
clear whether creationists are willing to go this far or not.  
The traditional approach to science and religion attempts to find necessary and 
sufficient conditions for science and religion. By contrast, the exemplar approach to science 
and religion attempts to determine whether an activity is scientific or religious, depending on 
how similar it is to exemplar scientific and religious activities. Objectors might point out that 
there is a similarity between the two approaches. Defenders of each approach can agree that 
we learn important scientific and religious ideas by looking at the practices of science and 
religion. 
     The objectors are right on this account. I want to, however, emphasize an important 
dissimilarity between the two approaches. The traditional approach affirms, while the 
exemplar approach denies, that we can define science and religion in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. It follows that the defenders of the traditional approach need to specify 
the conditions to prove that the creationist hypothesis does not count as scientific. In contrast, 
the defenders of the exemplar approach need not specify the conditions to prove that the 
creationist hypothesis does not count as scientific. They need only to prove that it is more 
similar to exemplar religious hypotheses than to exemplar scientific hypotheses. Laudan’s 
case against the traditional approach makes it clear that the exemplar approach is preferable 
to the traditional approach. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Laudan has refuted a few philosophers’ attempts to define science in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. Even so, we can judge whether certain activities are scientific or 
religious, depending on how similar they are to exemplar scientific activities or to exemplar 
religious activities. Also, we should teach exemplar scientific hypotheses to our children in 
science classrooms, and we should not teach exemplar religious hypotheses or borderline 
hypotheses to them. The creationist hypothesis that God created the universe is an exemplar 
religious hypothesis. Therefore, it should not be taught in science classrooms. 
Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, and Hinduism are different religions, although they 
cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, because each of them has 
its own exemplar activities. Analogously, science and religion are different enterprises, 
although they cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, because there 
are exemplar scientific activities and exemplar religious activities. Science and religion can 
maintain their identities and can have their independent domains, as long as there are 
exemplar scientific activities and exemplar religious activities. Science education and 
religious education ought not to encroach upon each other’s domains, even if there is no 
demarcation between science and religion. 
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